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An “Untrammeled Right”? The McCarran
Immigration Subcommittee and the Origins of
Presidential Authority to Suspend and Restrict
Alien Entry Under §1182(f)
H. Richard Friman
Marquette University

Abstract
The language of Section 212(e) of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1182(f), contains a
sweeping authorization of presidential discretion to suspend and restrict alien entry into the United States.
Senator Pat McCarran (D-NV) first introduced the subsection in 1950 as part of the omnibus immigration bill
drafted by his Judiciary Committee’s immigration subcommittee. The specific origins of the language and the
original intent behind the subsection remain missing pieces in the extensive scholarly literature on the 1952 INA
and legislative history as explored by the courts. This article reveals that the subcommittee modeled the

subsection on the sixth proviso of the 1917 Immigration Act, the May 1918 Wartime Measure, and a selective
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent. The article reveals further that the original intent behind the
subsection was to close perceived loopholes in existing law enabling entry by displaced persons and Communist
governmental officials.

Keywords

immigration, alien entry, refugees, subversives, presidential authority

On April 25, 1952, the last day of the House floor debate over the McCarran-Walter omnibus
immigration bill (H.R. 5678), Representative Abraham Multer (D-NY) introduced what he described as a
“simple” amendment.1 For well over a year, opponents in the House and Senate had argued against
the bill’s provisions with little effect. With the rival Humphrey-Lehman immigration bill stalled in the
Senate, Multer and Representative Emanuel Celler (D-NY) turned to a last-ditch effort to modify
McCarran-Walter. Multer’s amendment focused on the bill’s controversial Section 212(e), which, he
noted, posited “that at any time the President finds the entry of any aliens or class of aliens would be
detrimental to the interests of the United States he may by proclamation suspend the entry of those
aliens.” The amendment called for language limiting such authority to “when the United States is at
war or during a national emergency declared by the President.”2
Other provisions under McCarran-Walter had reaffirmed and expanded existing law on specific
categories of aliens excluded from entering the country. Yet Section 212(e) was different. The House
Judiciary Committee’s Report to accompany H.R. 5678 released in February 1952 revealed no
counterpart to the proposed subsection in existing law.3 In the report’s minority opinion, Celler wrote
that 212(e) was “an abdication by Congress of the control of immigration” and a “dangerous
substitution of government by law, by government by man.”4 Speaking on behalf of the Multer
amendment two months later, Celler reiterated these themes and expressed his concern that with
such language “the President is given an untrammeled right, an uninhibited right to suspend
immigration entirely.”5 The Multer amendment failed as did similar efforts to change the language in
the Senate.6 The broad authority under Section 212(e) remained in McCarran-Walter becoming part of
the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and is now known as 8 U.S.C. §1182(f).
Despite the extensive scholarship on the origins and impact of the 1952 INA in American immigration
policy, this portion of the act and particularly the intent of those who drafted and supported this
measure remain underexplored. The literature on McCarran-Walter includes detailed analyses of the
omnibus bill’s reaffirmation of the national-origins quota system as well as steps ending exclusion and
extension of quotas to Asians, expanding excludable and deportable classes of aliens, and removing
racial, national, and gendered barriers to citizenship.7 Scholars have broadly traced the origins of
McCarran-Walter to the work of Senator Pat McCarran (D-NV) and the special investigative
immigration subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee coordinated by his staff director Richard
Arens.8 Yet the specific origins of the language and the original intent behind Section 212(e) remain
missing pieces in this literature.
Similarly, the legislative history of §1182(f) as explored by the courts has done little to fill this
gap.9 Before 2017, the most important piece of the “limited case law” on the subsection was the U.S.

Supreme Court’s brief discussion in the 1993 Sale v. Haitian Center Council Inc. concerning President
George W. Bush’s Executive Order on the interdiction of Haitian refugees.10 Writing for the majority,
Justice John Paul Stevens noted that the statute “granted the President ample power to establish a
naval blockade” to deny entry to “illegal Haitian migrants.”11 But neither the majority nor dissenting
justices delved into the origins of the statute’s language or the original congressional intent.12 Although
case law on §1182(f) increased dramatically in 2017 with the legal challenges to President Donald J.
Trump’s travel ban, these gaps remained. Unlike in Sale, the courts in 2017 and 2018 in Hawaii et al. v.
Trump et al., and Trump et al. v. Hawaii et al. looked more closely into the origins of this subsection in
McCarran-Walter. Yet as discussed below in addressing origins, both the Ninth District and U.S.
Supreme Court limited their focus to, and drew contending interpretations from, only one small part of
floor debate over the Multer amendment.13
In contrast to the conventional focus on McCarran-Walter by scholars and the courts, this article
reveals that understanding the language and intent behind §1182(f) requires a wider exploratory net.
As discussed below, McCarran first introduced Section 212(e) on April 20, 1950, as part of the omnibus
immigration bill, S. 3455, drafted by the Judiciary Committee’s immigration subcommittee he chaired.
The full text of 212(e) proposed that:
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the
United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States he may by
proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary suspend the entry of all aliens or
any class of aliens be they immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any
restrictions he may deem appropriate.”14
This is the language that survived the subsequent deliberative process intact and became §1182(f).
I argue that McCarran and the subcommittee modeled the language of this subsection on three
sources. The first was an obsolete provision of presidential discretionary authority over entry by
Japanese laborers introduced in 1907 and later reaffirmed under the 1917 Immigration Act. The
second was existing presidential authority by proclamation over alien entry and exit during periods of
war and national emergency under the May 1918 Wartime Measure, as amended. The third was a
selective interpretation of Supreme Court decisions on congressional and presidential authority over
alien entry.
Compared to constraints on discretion under existing law, the sweeping presidential authority to
suspend or restrict entry proposed under Section 212(e) was new, and as such poses a puzzle as to the
drafters’ intent. Through the 1940s, Congress had fought a series of battles seeking to rein in President
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s legacy of expanding executive branch power. Measures such as the 1946
Administrative Procedure Act introduced extensive congressional oversight of federal administrative
agencies’ procedures and practices.15 As McCarran argued on March 12, 1946, on behalf of the
Committee of the Judiciary in support of the proposed act, “The law is the thing that makes democracy
vital. This is not a Government of men. It is a Government of law.”16 Years later the irony of McCarran’s
shift from this position to the sweeping language of Section 212(e) in McCarran-Walter was not lost on
the immigration bill’s opponents.17

As seen above, Celler’s minority opinion in the House Judiciary Committee’s Report on McCarranWalter used McCarran’s words on the importance of law and the need for limits on executive power to
argue against 212(e). In the Senate, Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) and Herbert Lehman (D-NY) pointedly
argued that the McCarran-Walter supporters were “among those who constantly are speaking of
usurpation of power by the Executive and of the importance of constitutional checks and of the due
process of law.”18 Similarly, the Truman administration’s legislative review of the proposed INA
observed that language on sweeping presidential authority in McCarran-Walter’s Section 212(e)
contrasted with “provisions which would tend to place the Executive agencies concerned with
immigration [specifically the State Department’s Visa Division and the Justice Department’s
Immigration and Naturalization Service] under closer supervision and control by the Congress.”19
I argue that the intent of McCarran and the subcommittee with the language of 212(e) was twofold.
First, the language was intended as a counterweight to presidential actions and congressional
legislation expanding entry for displaced persons, especially European Jewish refugees. For members
of the subcommittee, these aliens posed cultural, criminal, subversive, and other threats to the United
States. Second, the language was intended to address loopholes in existing law seen by the
subcommittee as allowing Communists to enter the country under the protected class of foreign
governmental officials. McCarran and the subcommittee introduced the language of Section 212(e) as
an additional layer of restriction to address these shortcomings.
The remainder of this article expands on these arguments. The first section explores the origins of the
subsection’s language and how it was modeled on existing law and selective interpretations of
decisions by the Supreme Court. The second section addresses the original intent of the immigration
subcommittee in introducing the language by tracing subcommittee concerns to earlier and concurrent
debates over displaced-persons legislation and fears of subversive entry through loopholes for foreign
officials in existing law. The third section extends the analysis beyond the first introduction of the
subsection in 1950 and turns to two incidents in the final congressional floor debates over McCarranWalter that offer further insights into the issue of original intent.

THE ORIGINS OF 212(E) LANGUAGE

Drawing on a “historical-institutionalist approach,” Daniel Tichenor argues that the provisions of
McCarran-Walter are best understood through the lens of Cold War pressures and powerful
restrictionist “’committee barons’” able to block the efforts of expanding coalitions of immigration
defenders and expert challenges to the racial necessity of alien exclusion.20 This approach offers a
useful starting point. McCarran clearly epitomized the restrictive congressional committee
baron.21 McCarran filled the immigration subcommittee with restrictionist anticommunist members of
the Judiciary Committee, including James Eastland (D-MS), and relied on his like-minded staff such as
Arens to manage the subcommittee’s investigations. As discussed below, Arens played a lead role in
conducting subcommittee hearings on displaced persons and subversive aliens, drafting the
subcommittee’s omnibus immigration bill and its accompanying report, and in subsequent Senate
hearings over McCarran-Walter.
That McCarran and the immigration subcommittee were responsible for the omnibus bill still begs the
question of how they derived the language for 212(e). The answer to this question is all the more

difficult given that no explicit discussion of the subsection’s origins appears in the subcommittee’s
detailed, 900-plus page report accompanying the omnibus bill or in subsequent hearings or
testimony.22 Scholars of American political development point to the impact of institutionalized past
choices as well as agency of political actors on the direction of policy.23 The legislative history of the
origins of the omnibus bill suggests that both were at play in the case of 212(e). For McCarran and the
immigration subcommittee, the 1917 and 1924 Immigration acts comprised the primary baseline of
existing law on exclusion and admissibility and were emblematic of its problems. Moreover, the
subcommittee report argued that an omnibus bill was necessary in light of the additional “200
additional legislative enactments . . . a number of treaties, Executive orders, proclamations, and a great
many rules, regulations, and operations instructions” on immigration, not including the array of
measures on naturalization.24 Using the comprehensive immigration acts as the framework on which to
build a new omnibus bill allowed the subcommittee to argue to other members of Congress that they
were retaining the best of existing law while addressing its critical gaps. Reviewing the legislative
history of McCarran’s 1950 omnibus bill suggests that the subcommittee modeled the language of
Section 212(e) on the following sources: the sixth proviso of the 1917 Immigration Act; the May 1918
Wartime Measure, as amended; and selective interpretations of U.S. Supreme Court rulings on the
plenary power of Congress and the Executive to restrict alien entry.

The Comprehensive Acts

The immigration subcommittee report framed the issue of alien entry in terms of two categories,
excludable and admissible aliens. The subcommittee used the 1917 Immigration Act, especially Section
3, as its primary entry point into the subject of excludable aliens. This section listed multiple classes of
aliens automatically denied entry, such as convicted criminals, paupers, and the mentally and
physically infirm. But the section also listed a series of provisos that established “exceptions to the
excludable classes,” such as persons convicted of political offenses, and “all aliens who were accredited
officials of foreign governments, and their suites, families, or guests.”25 The subcommittee report
explored each of the excludable classes and the provisos in detail and discussed recommendations for
changes under a proposed omnibus bill. These changes included expanding the number and scope of
the excludable classes, particularly to include Communists and other subversives, and narrowing the
exceptions to exclusion.26
The subcommittee used the 1924 Immigration Act as its baseline for addressing the relative
admissibility of aliens based on their national origin. The act distinguished between quota immigrants
subject to annual limits on entry and nonquota immigrants, primarily from the Western hemisphere,
who were exempt from the national-origins quota system. Nonimmigrant aliens such as tourists and
visitors, those in transit, foreign government officials, and alien seamen were also exempt from the
national-origins quotas.27 The subcommittee report reviewed each of these categories and offered
recommendations on ways in which the system should be modified under the omnibus bill. The
subcommittee reaffirmed the basic structure of the national-origins system, especially its privileging of
Northern and Western Europeans, added Asians to the system by allowing limited alien entry from the
“Asia-Pacific triangle,” and emphasized the need for denying access to those aliens who regardless of
their immigrant, nonimmigrant, and/or protected status fell within the excludable classes as defined by
the subcommittee’s proposed changes to the 1917 Act.28

The subcommittee report’s primary reference to language that would become Section 212(e) appeared
in the discussion of modifying the sixth proviso in Section 3 of the 1917 Act.29 The report described this
proviso as unique. It was “the only one [in the 1917 Act] that permits the prohibition of certain aliens
rather than the entry of otherwise excludable aliens.”30 The proviso empowered the President to
prohibit entry by aliens seeking to access the continental United States through third countries, U.S.
insular possessions, or the Panama Canal zone, when he was “satisfied” that passports issued by
foreign governments were “being used” for such a “purpose . . . to the detriment of labor conditions
therein.”31 The proviso’s language contained no conditions limiting discretionary authority to war or
proclamations of national emergency, nor did it contain any criteria for presidential determinations of
detrimental effect.
The subcommittee report noted that the members had learned from a representative of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service that the language of the sixth proviso actually predated
1917.32 Appearing in the Immigration Act of February 20, 1907, the Gentleman’s Agreement between
the United States and Japan, and President Theodore Roosevelt’s Executive Order 589 of March 14,
1907, the language was intended to target Japanese laborers evading exclusion by entering the U.S.
through Mexico, Canada, and Hawaii.33 The report noted that subsequent changes in immigration law
and practice had solved this problem. The introduction of the national-origins quota system and
restrictive visa provisions under the 1924 Immigration Act addressed the transit practice, and the
changing relationship with Japan had included President Harry Truman’s revocation of Roosevelt’s
original Executive Order in October 1948.34
As a result, the subcommittee concluded that the sixth proviso was no longer necessary and the
subcommittee report called for its deletion. But in the report’s next sentence the subcommittee noted
that the omnibus immigration bill would be adding new language in place of the sixth proviso. Without
any further explanation or detail, the report stated that “a general provision is being included in the
proposed [omnibus] law to permit the President to suspend any and all immigration whenever he finds
such action to be desirable in the best interest of the country.”35 In the report’s appendix summarizing
provisions of the omnibus bill, the subcommittee noted further that “the President is given the power
to suspend or restrict entry of any alien or class of aliens whose admission he finds to be detrimental
to the interests of the United States.”36 Like that of the sixth proviso, this language linked discretionary
authority to restrict alien entry to presidential determinations of detrimental effect. But the new
provision was much broader.

Discretionary Authority in Wartime or Proclamations of National Emergency

Although the sixth proviso informed the language of the Section 212(e), the model for the mechanism
of presidential proclamation to invoke such discretionary authority over alien entry found in the
subsection lies elsewhere. Here the subcommittee appeared to turn to language found in existing law
imposing “extraordinary controls” on subversive aliens in times of war and national emergency.37 The
subcommittee observed that as early as 1798 the “concern of Congress” with subversion had resulted
in laws authorizing the President to take such steps against subversive aliens by proclamation in the
name of “public safety.”38 Where the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 had focused on “the alien resident in
time of war or threatened invasion,” subsequent acts of Congress had included authority to impose
additional controls on alien entry.39 Under the May 22, 1918, Wartime Immigration Act, as amended

June 21, 1941, Congress authorized the President to exclude aliens “upon finding it in the interests of
the United States” during periods of war or presidential proclamation of national
emergency.40 President Franklin D. Roosevelt had proclaimed such an emergency on May 27, 1941, and
called for additional controls on alien entry by “Proclamation 2523 on November 14, 1941.”41 The
subcommittee report noted further that regulations introduced by the Attorney General at this time
“continue in effect as part of the immigration laws, since the national emergency has never been
terminated and a state of war still exists.”42
Recent public scholarship on Section 212(e) contends that its origins lie in the long history of existing
law, as reviewed by the immigration subcommittee in its report, empowering the President to restrict
alien entry by proclamation in times of war and national emergency.43 This claim is only partially
correct. The subcommittee explicitly included the language of the May 22, 1918, Wartime Immigration
Act, as amended, in the 1950 omnibus immigration bill as Section 216(a),44 and discussed this linkage in
the report.45 Yet, the subcommittee made no such link between this history and 212(e), either as a
basic peacetime version of wartime presidential authority or a step necessitated by the pending end of
the wartime state of emergency.46 Instead, the subcommittee added portions of the language on
presidential proclamation to the framework of the sixth proviso.

Plenary Power

A third possible source for the sweeping language of Section 212(e) lies in the subcommittee’s reading
of court decisions at the time of the report’s preparation.47 Drawing on the Supreme Court’s January
16, 1950, arguments in Knauff v. Shaughnessy, as grounded in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, the
subcommittee report contended: “It is well established by decisions of the Supreme Court that every
sovereign nation has the power, inherent in its sovereignty, to forbid the entrance of aliens or to admit
them upon such conditions as it may prescribe.”48 But where the court in Knauff went on to emphasize
that such authority was “inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation,”
the subcommittee report adopted a different tack.49 Drawing on the court’s 1914 ruling in Lapina v.
Williams, the subcommittee stressed that “the authority of Congress over the admission of aliens [to
the United States] is plenary.”50 Congress may “exclude them all together or prescribe the terms upon
which they may enter and remain in the country.”51
Earlier sections of the subcommittee report dealing with excludable classes were written before
the Knauff ruling.52 Here the subcommittee pointed to the 1889 Chinese exclusion case of Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, where “the Supreme Court held that the power of the Congress to exclude aliens
from the country is an incident of sovereignty.”53 The subcommittee argued further that “the courts
have also held that it is proper for the Congress to delegate its power to control immigration to officials
who may have discretionary power and who are made sole and exclusive judges of the existence of
facts concerning the entrance of immigrants under the immigration laws.”54
These arguments reinforced a central theme in the subcommittee report that the “concern of
Congress” had been at the forefront of existing law empowering the President to address threats to
public safety posed by alien entry.55 Citing this plenary power, the subcommittee presented its
recommendations for “additional restrictions on alien subversives” to be included in the omnibus
bill.56 These recommendations included expanding the discretionary power of consular officials, the
Commissioner of Immigration, the Attorney General, and, as discussed below in cases of foreign

government officials, the President.57 Yet, once again the report made no mention of the language of
Section 212(e) in this context. That said, the subcommittee’s interpretation of the plenary power of
Congress over alien admission would allow for the creation of such language empowering the
President to restrict alien entry on determination that such entry was detrimental to the United States.

THE TARGETS OF DISCRETIONARY EXCLUSION

On the surface, the language of Section 212(e) was a blanket authorization to restrict alien entry. But
this interpretation fails to capture the subcommittee’s concerns with particular groups. In hearings
held by the subcommittee from 1947 to 1950, references to the threat posed by two groups stood out:
refugees, especially European Jews and Communist subversives entering the United States through the
refugee process; and Communist subversive foreign government officials and representatives of
international organizations entering the United States through proviso loopholes in the 1917
Immigration Act, as amended, and the 1945 International Organizations Immunities Act.

The Refugee Threat

By the late 1940s, McCarran and the immigration subcommittee were at the forefront of efforts in the
Senate to limit the entry of displaced persons into the United States. These efforts came in the context
of earlier restrictionist successes during the 1930s in blocking access by the rising number of displaced
persons in Europe. Congressional backlash and opposition within the Department of State had stymied
efforts by advocates of admission for predominantly Jewish refugees from Germany during the late
1930s and early 1940s.58 In 1944, President Roosevelt took a different tack by establishing the War
Refugee Board by Executive Order 9417 of January 22 and announcing to Congress on June 12 that an
emergency, temporary shelter for up to one thousand refugees had been established at Fort Ontario in
Oswego, New York.59 Senator Rufus C. Holman (R-OR), a noted anti-Semite and restrictionist, captured
the opposition’s reaction as he challenged the constitutionality of such a step “to set aside and violate
the laws of Congress restricting immigration into our country.”60
On December 22, 1945, President Harry S. Truman took further action. Noting the magnitude of the
population dislocation problem in Europe and the important but “small” steps at Fort Oswego, Truman
issued a Directive on Immigration calling for the establishment of “consular facilities at or near
displaced persons and refugee assembly centers in the American zones of occupation” in Europe.
Consular officials would determine eligibility for immigration under existing national origin quotas and
provisions on excludable classes as well as “simplify” and “hasten the process of issuing visas.”61 Yet by
working within the existing quota system and relying on officials resistant to expanded immigration,
the impact of the directive was limited to “only 5,000 displaced persons” admitted “in the first nine
months of 1946.”62 Dissatisfaction over these results prompted calls by Truman and supporters of
displaced persons for new legislative efforts beginning in 1947 that culminated in the 1948 Displaced
Person Act (DPA).63
McCarran, along with Senator Chapman Revercomb (R-WV), comprised the initial core of the Judiciary
Committee’s special immigration subcommittee, established on July 26, 1947, to investigate the state
of the country’s immigration laws and to prepare a separate report on the displaced persons
issue.64 The latter took initial priority.65 The subcommittee report and accompanying displaced persons
bill introduced in the Senate on March 2, 1948, set a baseline for a more restrictionist response to the

displaced persons problem. The report noted that refugees were suspect as Communist subversives
and a likely economic burden on the United States. Moreover, the report stated that refugees
predominantly consisted of Jews that were manipulating the displaced-persons eligibility process
through fraud, few being left in the occupation zones by the date of Truman’s 1945 directive, and
through undue political influence by their wealthy supporters.66 Similar themes had been raised by
Arens during his questioning of witnesses during an early July 1947 subcommittee hearing over a bill to
allow the entry of displaced persons orphaned by the war.67 To address these perceived shortcomings,
the subcommittee bill included restrictive measures such as limiting the numbers of displaced persons
to one hundred thousand over two years and restricting access to those “people registered as
displaced persons” as of December 22, 1945.68 The final congressional compromise in the DPA retained
this eligibility date with few exceptions, but doubled the overall cap by counting refugee admissions
against future national quotas—in other words, letting in more refugees from countries otherwise
limited by reducing, in theory, how many could come from those countries in future years.69 Truman
“reluctantly” signed the DPA on June 25, 1948, observing that it “discriminates in callous fashion
against displaced persons of the Jewish faith.”70 Shortly thereafter, supporters of displaced persons
turned to efforts to amend the DPA.
McCarran worked hard to derail these efforts using his position as chair of the Judiciary Committee
from 1949 on to delay consideration of proposed legislation.71 Michael Ybarra writes that opposition to
access by displaced Jews, and to Jews more broadly, underpinned McCarran’s legislative efforts and
public rhetoric about the threat of Communist subversives and other undesirables posing as
refugees.72 After multiple delaying tactics in 1949 and with an array of restrictionist amendments, the
deliberations over refugee legislation finally made it out of committee to the Senate floor in early
1950. McCarran again worked to derail legislation with more delays and amendments but ultimately
without success. In early April, the Senate passed a new displaced-persons bill expanding refugee
access.73
After Senator Revercomb lost his seat in the 1948 elections, McCarran became chair of the immigration
subcommittee as well as the Judiciary Committee in 1949.74 During subcommittee hearings over
displaced persons held from March 1949 through March 1950, McCarran had Arens take the lead in
selecting witnesses and using targeted questions to make the case against any expansion of refugee
access. Arens and McCarran repeatedly utilized witness testimony during the hearings to point to the
number of Jews admitted under the DPA as proof that the act was not discriminatory. They also turned
to the same numbers to stress that Jews in large numbers were using fraudulent documents to falsely
claim presence in the allied occupied zones before the Truman Directive date necessary for
eligibility.75 Arens utilized witness testimony from subpoenaed members and disgruntled former
members of the Displaced Persons Commission to raise questions of Jewish influence over the
leadership and decision-making processes in determining eligibility, pressuring consular and
immigration officials, and directing efforts to amend the DPA.76 Arens and members of the
subcommittee such as James Eastland rejected the distinction made by commissioners between
displaced persons turning to limited black market participation to survive and large-scale illicit
activities, arguing that such distinctions masked widespread criminal proclivity among Jewish refugees
in addition to their alleged document fraud.77 Finally, subcommittee members repeatedly posed
questions, and echoed supporting answers, about the inherent threats in changing the baseline dates

for eligibility as opening the door to even greater threats of Jewish and other Communist subversives
entering the United States under the guise of displaced persons.78
Arens and McCarran vehemently rejected or simply ignored the efforts by the few witnesses such as
Celler who tried to push back against the tenor of the hearings.79As Arens noted after a particularly
contentious exchange with Harry Rosenfield of the Displaced Persons Commission, “every patriotic
American in this country ought to get on his knees every night and thank the Good Lord that we have
the senior senator from Nevada who has been waging this fight against tremendous odds and against a
million dollar lobby. . . . There is no question but what there is a complete breakdown in the
administration of this law, so that black marketers, subversives, criminals, undesirables are gaining
admission into this country.” 80
The subcommittee hearings continued through March 1950, reaffirming conclusions that Arens and
McCarran had already reached on the need for restrictive measures against displaced persons. The
Judiciary Committee had already submitted its version of the House bill amending the DPA along with a
supporting report drafted by Arens on January 25, and the Senate floor debate over the bill began on
February 28.81 At the same time as McCarran was fighting a losing battle to derail the DPA, the
immigration subcommittee was working on its larger report in support of McCarran’s draft omnibus
immigration bill.82
The final report of the immigration subcommittee that accompanied the omnibus immigration bill was
less strident on the refugee issue but in several ways reaffirmed earlier arguments that the country
was at risk. The subcommittee posited the national-origins quota system as an essential part of the
omnibus immigration bill, acknowledging and approving the fact that this system had privileged
Western and Northern Europeans and tightly restricted entry of less “assimilable” aliens from Southern
and Eastern European countries.83 The subcommittee further noted the dramatic rise of “new”
immigrant populations dominated by “Italians, the Slavs and Jews.”84 The discussion of Jewish
immigration was particularly slanted conveying a rising threat. The report mixed an array of baselines
and trends noting, for example, that: while Jews comprised less than 4 percent of the U.S. population
in 1937, they accounted for “between 25 and 77 percent of total net immigration” since that time.
Moreover, their population growth since 1877 of 21 percent had outstripped that of the overall United
States by a factor of seven and had increased 2.5 million since 1881.85 The report also noted that
Jewish refugees accounted for 26 percent of those admitted under the 1948 DPA.86
The report made only brief additional references to the refugee issue. For example, one section noted
the visa set-asides in the 1948 DPA for refugees who had worked in agriculture and were likely to
continue to do so in the United States as precedent for adding greater occupational “selectivity” in
future immigration law.87 Yet no mention was made that McCarran and Revercomb had introduced
this provision in 1948 as way of discriminating against Jews who were less likely to qualify due to other
occupational pursuits.88 The subcommittee report also briefly discussed displaced persons in the
context of the national-origins quotas. Although the initial impact of DPA legislation would be
temporary, the report stated, refugee access created “confusion” in the distribution of preference
categories for a given country and mortgaged alien entry against future quotas.89 Moreover, refugee
provisions would clash with other set-asides in the Austrian and German national-origin quotas for
ethnic Germans under the 1948 DPA. The report made no mention of the contentious issue of Jewish

discrimination or the efforts of McCarran and subcommittee members to reclassify ethnic Germans
born in Eastern European countries as displaced persons and therefore eligible for entry under the
DPA.90
McCarran’s losing battle against displaced-persons legislation helps to explain why the subcommittee
included Section 212(e) in the omnibus bill. In 1944 and 1945, Presidents Roosevelt and Truman had
used the power of the office to circumvent congressional opposition and existing law to expand access
for displaced persons. The language of 212(e) offered a future restrictionist president a way to stop
refugees from coming into the United States. The linkage and the immigration subcommittee’s focus
on the threats posed by Jewish displaced persons was not lost on the opposition. Jewish groups had
been at the forefront of lobbying on behalf of the 1948 DPA and its expansion.91 By 1951 they were
continuing this role in public hearings over McCarran’s omnibus immigration bill, calling attention to
and opposing the unprecedented expansion of presidential authority proposed in Section
212(e).92 Jewish members of Congress, including McCarran’s primary opponent in the 1950 refugee
clash, Senator Lehman, as well as Celler and Multer in the House, were also among the leading voices
challenging the sweeping language of 212(e).93

Foreign Officials and the Subversive Threat

The immigration subcommittee’s focus on inroads of alien subversion was not limited to displaced
persons. During the late 1940s, McCarran was also at the forefront of efforts in the Senate to introduce
legislation informed by the subcommittee’s investigations of how loopholes in existing immigration law
had intensified the Communist threat to national security. Part III of the subcommittee’s final report on
immigration focused on “Subversives.” Here the subcommittee framed its analysis of Communism as
“an alien force,” “an international conspiracy” that was infiltrating “our borders for the purpose of
overthrowing the democratic Government of the United States by force, violence, and
subversion.”94 Based on the subcommittee’s recommendations, the omnibus immigration bill added
multiple categories for Communists and other subversives to the classes of aliens excluded from
entry.95 However, the subcommittee also argued that as long as exceptions to exclusion existed that
offered paths to entry to Communists, simply expanding the scope of excludable classes was not
enough. These other paths had to be addressed.
Based on its investigations, the subcommittee noted the lack of restrictions on foreign government
officials and representatives of international organizations as a particular security threat.96 Specifically,
the 1917 Immigration Act’s tenth proviso had exempted “accredited officials of foreign government
officials” along with “their suites, families, or guests” from the classes of exclusion.97 The 1924
Immigration Act designated such persons as nonimmigrants, exempt from the visa provisions affecting
quota and nonquota immigrants, and made no change in their exemption from exclusion.98 In
December 1945, the International Organization Immunities Act extended these privileges to officers
and employees of organizations and their immediate family members.99
The subcommittee began to target these loopholes in 1949. On April 25, McCarran introduced
legislation, S. 1694, to better exclude and deport subversive aliens.100 Noting the initial findings of the
immigration subcommittee, McCarran argued that subversive Communist aliens, coordinated by the
Kremlin, were taking advantage of lax immigration laws to infiltrate the United States. McCarran
emphasized the “backdoors” of “exceptions and provisos” in existing law for representatives of

international organizations and commissions. These enabled entries by aliens who were feeding the
communist “lifeline” in the United States and supporting the “fifth column” threat to national security.
Responding to this threat, he argued, would require an expansion of “government power” to “plug the
loopholes” in existing law.101 McCarran’s bill, subsumed with more detail on May 11 into a second
McCarran bill, S. 1832, proposed amending existing law on anarchist exclusion and expulsion to
address the subversive threat.102
The subcommittee based the McCarran bills on the Immigration Act of October 16, 1918, as amended,
which had expanded the scope of excludable and deportable aliens on grounds of anarchistic behaviors
and affiliations beyond that first introduced in 1903.103 McCarran’s bill S. 1832 established a broader
category of activities “subversive to national security” and authorized the Attorney General to
determine the parameters of this category as well as identify “every [subversive] association, society,
and group” “on the basis of evidence satisfactory to him.”104 The bill further empowered the Attorney
General to exclude and deport, without limitation or interference, “any alien,” including tenth proviso
aliens, he “knows or believes” to be seeking to enter, or has entered, the United States to engage in
subversive activities.105
During public hearings over the next five months, the subcommittee questioned witnesses who
expounded on the Communist threat and called for action along the lines of the McCarran bill.106 As in
the DPA hearings, Arens coordinated the witnesses and had them repeat and expand on portions of
their testimony when it supported the subcommittee’s concerns.107 Communists and former
Communists appearing under subpoena responded in the affirmative when Arens asked whether
subversives were entering the United States as “affiliates or invitees of the United Nations” and other
international organizations, and the extent to which “Communist activities in the United States are
under the direction, control and supervision of the officials of iron-curtain countries who are in the
United States.”108 L. Paul Wining, General Counsel for the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and
consultant to the subcommittee in drafting the McCarran bill, pointed to the constraining effects of the
tenth proviso on excluding alien subversives.109 The subcommittee also subpoenaed the Secretary of
State and the Attorney General for access to information in files on officials and employees of foreign
governments and the United Nations engaged in subversive activity in the United States.110 Arens used
subsequent testimony by AG Thomas Clark and State Department representatives to repeatedly call
attention to the tenth proviso and the ease of access by subversive foreign officials.111
Despite the extensive hearings, McCarran’s bill went no further in 1949. As part of a delaying tactic on
the revisions of the DPA, McCarran had left the country from mid-September to early December for a
tour of Europe to assess the displaced persons issue.112 With McCarran away, the subcommittee
returned to drafting its immigration report and incorporated the findings of the hearings into brief
chapters on the subversive threat and the shortfalls of existing law.113 As noted in the Congressional
Quarterly Almanac, the 1950 omnibus immigration bill “included all of S. 1832.”114 Yet this
conclusion was incorrect. The subcommittee’s recommendations and the omnibus bill did not include
the 1949 proposals for broadly empowering the Attorney General to exclude or deport any alien on
grounds of subversion.115 Instead, the subcommittee’s approach had become more nuanced.
The subcommittee report proposed narrowing the scope of the tenth proviso by disaggregating its
privileged class. The subcommittee recommended that some previously protected aliens such as

“guests” of foreign officials be removed from nonimmigrant status. Those remaining would be divided
into subcategories to better allow for determinations of privilege and exemption from exclusion.116 The
subcommittee proposed that the exclusion of high-level foreign officials and representatives, such as
“Ambassadors, public ministers, and career diplomatic or consular officials,” would be the purview of
the President.117 Specifically, the subcommittee proposed that the President be empowered to restrict
entry for such officials “where it is known that they seek to enter the United States to engage in
activities prejudicial to the public interest or which will endanger the public welfare or safety
[emphasis added].”118 In language that would also be incorporated into the omnibus immigration bill,
the subcommittee noted further that “Consistent with Constitutional limitations, such authority may
be exercised only under such rules and regulations as the President deems to be necessary.”119 All
other tenth proviso aliens could be denied entry by consular officials and the Commissioner of
Immigration on less stringent standards.120 Here authorities could deny entry where the alien’s
activities are “believed to be prejudicial [emphasis added]” or “where it is known or there is reason to
believe [emphasis added]” their activities were “considered to be subversive to national security.”121
Despite the extensive discussion of the recommended changes in executive authority to narrow the
tenth proviso loophole, the subcommittee report made no reference to the ability of the President to
restrict entry of the highest foreign officials and international organization representatives if their
subversive intent was believed but not known. The sweeping language of Section 212(e) would give the
President such authority. Yet the subcommittee report never explicitly made this argument; the closest
it came was in summarizing the omnibus bill in the appendix. Here the report briefly reviewed the
Section 3 provisos of the 1917 Act as “retained, modified, changed or repealed” in the omnibus
bill.122 Only five remained of the original ten provisos and of these only two were unchanged. The
summary noted that the exemption from exclusion for those convicted of a “purely political offense”
and the exemption for “foreign-government and international organization officials” would be
“continued.”123 Yet as discussed above, the summary was misleading as the latter exemption had been
narrowed considerably. The next and last sentence of this part of the summary appeared as a catchall
statement that had the potential to narrow entry by admissible aliens even further. Here the appendix
inserted the summary language of 212(e) noted above: “The President is given the power to suspend
or restrict entry of any alien or class of aliens whose admission he finds to be detrimental to the
interests of the United States.”124

REVISITING INTENT

Although opponents of McCarran-Water repeatedly rejected Section 212(e), few examples exist of
congressional supporters speaking on behalf of the proposed language. In April and May 1952,
opposition efforts to amend McCarran-Walter in the final floor debates in the House and Senate
included two incidents that offer further insight into the extent of presidential authority originally
envisioned under subsection. The first is the debate over the Multer Amendment in the House, the
second is the deal on technical amendments reached between McCarran and Humphrey in the Senate.
Beyond broadly noting that last-ditch efforts to amend McCarran-Walter failed, scholars have paid
little attention to either incident. In the 2017–18 travel ban cases, the courts narrowly turned to part of
the first incident and made no mention of the other.125

Backdrop

Efforts to determine McCarran’s as well as broader congressional intent behind Section 212(e) in the
legislative history from the time that he introduced the omnibus immigration bill in April 1950 to the
final passage of McCarran-Walter are challenging at best. Deliberations over an array of internalsecurity bills and investigations and the impact of the onset of the Korean War delayed hearings until
March 1951.126 As subsequent iterations of the McCarran-Walter bill moved through Congress in 1951
and early 1952, the original 1950 language of Section 212(e) remained unchanged.127 During this
period, members of the subcommittee, the Judiciary Committee, and restrictionist supporters in the
Senate and House lauded McCarran-Walter but made no mention of this specific provision of the bill in
hearings or floor remarks. This pattern persisted even as opponents attacked the subsection as an
unprecedented expansion of presidential power to restrict all immigration.128
In the absence of a restrictionist response, the opposition moved beyond simply rejecting the measure
and sought to fight a rearguard action limiting its potential impact. In hearings held on McCarranWalter in 1951, the House and Senate Judiciary Committee minority reports on McCarran-Walter
released in early 1952, and days of floor testimony during May 1952, the opposition argued that any
broad presidential authority to suspend or restrict immigration should be limited to times of war or
declarations of national emergency.129 Furthermore, and as formally introduced in the rival HumphreyLehman omnibus immigration bill on March 12, 1952, the opposition argued that if the President was
to be granted the power to suspend or restrict entry, he should also be empowered to temporarily
admit aliens when in the country’s interest.130 As this rival bill languished in McCarran’s Judiciary
Committee, the opposition turned to amendments in the House and Senate to try and insert the same
language into McCarran-Walter.

The Multer Amendment Debate

In the final House deliberations over amendments to McCarran-Walter on April 25, 1952, Multer
introduced a two-part amendment to Section 212(e). The first limited presidential authority to suspend
alien entry by proclamation, replacing “Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of
any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States
[emphasis added]” with “When the United States is at war or during the existence of a national
emergency proclaimed by the President and [emphasis added].”131 The second part of the amendment
proposed that when under the same conditions of war and national emergency “the President finds
the entry or any aliens or any class of aliens into the United States would promote the interests of the
United States, or is necessary to provide sanctuary to persecuted aliens or any class of aliens and would
not be contrary to the best interests of the United States, he may by proclamation and for such period
as he shall deem desirable, suspend such restrictions on the entry of aliens for temporary residence as
he may deem appropriate [emphasis added].”132
Four House members spoke against the amendment. Explicitly and implicitly, their underlying concern
was the threat posed by refugees. Representatives Thomas A. Jenkins (R-OH) and Richard W. Hoffman
(R-IL) viewed the second part of the amendment as empowering the President to “admit additional
millions of aliens” that would be unlikely to ever leave.133 Representative Charles Halleck (R-IN)
observed that the amendment would allow the President to end-run Congress and the limits on
refugee admissions agreed to under the Displaced Persons Act.134 Multer acknowledged that this was

in fact the case, though “only at certain times for limited periods.”135 In effect, the proposed language
in the second part of the amendment would explicitly authorize action along the lines of the
controversial steps to aid displaced persons taken by Roosevelt in 1944 and Truman in 1945 but on a
potentially much larger scale.
Walter was the most vehement in his opposition and the only one to explicitly defend the original
language of Section 212(e). He began by chiding Multer for arguing that “the President should not have
the power to exclude; then in the same breath he urges that we give the President the power to
admit.”136 This argument was a response to the earlier efforts of the opposition to remove the
subsection entirely from McCarran-Walter rather than addressing the more nuanced rearguard
position. For Walter, the fact that the Multer amendment placed the same limiting conditions of war
and national emergency on exclusion and admission mattered little. Walter argued further the
presidential power to suspend entry under 212(e) was necessary to address emergency conditions
such as an epidemic of “communicable diseases” in an alien source country or during “a period of great
unemployment” in the United States where it would be “impossible for Congress to act” swiftly
enough.137 Years later, the Ninth Circuit’s December 2017 ruling in the travel ban case used Walter’s
statement to suggest that the original congressional intent behind 212(e) was for a narrow granting of
presidential authority limited to periods of “exigency” where Congress would be “unable to act in
timely manner, thus necessitating swift presidential action.”138 In turn, the U.S. Supreme Court in June
2018 rejected the lower court argument as emphasizing an isolated floor statement over what it
interpreted as the clear indication of broad congressional intent in the language of the subsection
itself. Writing for the majority, Justice John Roberts noted: “When Congress wishes to condition the
exercise of executive authority on the President’s finding of an exigency or crisis it knows how to say
just that.”139
Yet in exploring intent it is instructive to look further at the entire debate over the amendment,
something neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court did in the travel ban cases in 2017 and
2018. Walter’s examples in defense of the subsection were flawed. Existing law from 1917 as retained
under McCarran-Walter in Section 212(a) already allowed for the exclusion of aliens “afflicted . . .
[with] any dangerous contagious disease” and those likely to become a public charge such as “paupers,
professional beggars, or vagrants.” Moreover, the bill had added new language to the same
section excluding aliens seeking entry as “skilled or unskilled labor” where “sufficient workers” already
existed in the United States or the “wages and working conditions” of such workers would be
“adversely” affected.140 In effect, the mechanisms to address both of Walter’s scenarios were already
in place without 212(e). However, as the McCarran subcommittee had noted repeatedly since the late
1940s, displaced persons posed threats of disease and economic disruption along with the greater
challenges of crime and subversion and were gaining entry to the United States despite laws on
excludable classes.141 A constant theme in the subcommittee’s hearings was that efforts at tightening
legislation and its implementation had failed due to the influence of the supporters of displaced
persons. The Multer amendment reaffirmed this concern.
Multer and Celler did not challenge the accuracy of Walter’s exigency arguments. Instead, they
contended that the first part of the amendment was a necessary corrective to the “broad power” to
restrict alien entry in 212(e). When Halleck asked Celler if he would be less “concerned” if he could

assure “a President that could not do any wrong,” Celler replied that they likely shared a concern of
any President having a “blank check” over immigration or “unlimited power on any subject.” Celler
pointedly noted Halleck’s concerns over what Truman had done “recently” alluding to his controversial
seizure of steel mills by Executive Order earlier in the month.142 This argument fell on deaf ears. Multer
and Celler also tried to drop the controversial second part of the amendment from further
consideration. Walter successfully objected to such a move, noting that “one amendment” with both
of its parts was under consideration, and the amendment was rejected.143

The Package Deal

The second incident has received no attention from either scholars or the courts. On May 22, 1952,
during the final day of the Senate floor debate, McCarran announced that he and Humphrey had
reached a deal. They had discussed “the 153 to 157 amendments” to the omnibus immigration bill S.
2550 and had reached an agreement on twenty-one “minor, technical amendments.” McCarran noted
that he had agreed further that the amendments “may go to conference” and that he “would be willing
to accept those amendments en bloc” if so approved by the Senate.144 Humphrey formally introduced
the package of amendments reaffirming that they were “technical in nature,” that they had been
“carefully checked by the respective staffs” and those “Senators who are particularly concerned,” such
as Lehman.145 When asked by Humphrey to comment further, McCarran repeated that he had
accepted amendments “which had been offered and did not change the policy or theme of the
bill.”146 McCarran also reminded Humphrey, “the worth of the amendments will be considered
carefully” in conference and might “not fit” into the places he intended though “may fit in some place”
in the bill.147 The Senate approved the McCarran-Humphrey package of amendments without
objection. Humphrey then asked and received confirmation that the amendments would be printed
individually in the Congressional Record.148
Yet aside from McCarran, Humphrey, their staffs, and others alluded to in Humphrey’s statement, it is
not clear that anyone else at the time had read what had been proposed. Senator Leverett Saltonstall
(R-MA) was the lone voice who commented on the proposal to approve the twenty-one amendments
en bloc, and he simply asked for confirmation that they had all been agreed upon by Humphrey and
the Judiciary Committee.149 If the amendments had been read on the Senate floor, it would have
quickly become apparent that the package contained not only technical modifications but also some
“significant changes” to McCarran-Walter.150 Of particular note, the sixth change in the McCarranHumphrey deal proposed “in subsection 212(e) to strike out ‘Whenever’ and insert in lieu thereof:
‘When the United States is at war or during the existence of a national emergency proclaimed by the
President and.’”151 In short, this was the part of the same fallback language demanded by the
opposition since 1951 and that had failed in the House during the deliberations over the Multer
Amendment.
One interpretation of McCarran’s acceptance of such a change was that two years after the
subsection’s drafting by the immigration subcommittee he no longer saw the language as that
important. Although the alien threats remained, passage of the omnibus immigration bill was
paramount. In a letter and fact sheet sent to Eastland in early May, McCarran had pointed to critical
components of the bill under siege by opponents and the need for the bill’s passage. He did not
mention the language of Section 212(e).152 In addition, compared to McCarran’s preferred presidential

candidate, the restrictionist Senator Richard Russell (D-GA), neither of the leading contenders at the
time for the upcoming 1952 elections, Dwight D. Eisenhauer and Estes Kefauver, were likely to invoke
212(e).153 Thus, as McCarran had noted, the package deal contained only minor adjustments.
However, a more plausible interpretation is that McCarran’s acceptance of the revision was an empty,
tactical concession to facilitate the bill’s passage in the Senate. His comments to Humphrey regarding
what could take place in conference support this view. Walter’s response to the Multer amendment
the month before had also signaled that the technical change would not survive the House. McCarran
handpicked the conference committee, “excluding liberals and moderates all together,” further
assuring his desired result.154 Unsurprisingly, the technical amendment to Section 212(e) was not
mentioned in either the Senate or House discussions of the conference committee report and did not
appear in the conference version of McCarran-Walter.155 Section 212(e) as originally written in 1950
remained intact.

CONCLUSION

The language of Section 212(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as passed in 1952 contains a
sweeping authorization of presidential discretion to restrict alien entry into the United States. The
subsection empowers the President to backstop existing law on classes of excludable aliens and
override provisions on admissible aliens. Despite such authority and the potential for closing off all
alien entry, the origins of this subsection have been understudied by scholars and largely overlooked
by the courts. That the language of what would become the 1952 INA was initially drafted in toto by
McCarran’s immigration subcommittee is well known. Yet the origins and subcommittee intent behind
Section 212(e) are much less so.
Drawing on a detailed analysis of the report accompanying McCarran’s 1950 omnibus immigration bill,
this article reveals how the subcommittee modeled Section 212(e) on presidential discretionary
authority over alien entry in the sixth proviso of the 1917 Immigration Act, presidential authority to
restrict alien entry by proclamation under the May 1918 Wartime Measure, and a selective
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent on congressional and presidential authority over alien
entry. Insights into the reasons why the McCarran subcommittee added the language of Section 212(e)
to the 1950 omnibus immigration bill lie in concerns with refugees and subversives. Casting a wider
exploratory net beyond the subcommittee report, the article reveals the antipathy of the
subcommittee to particular types of displaced persons and foreign government officials. In Jewish
refugees, the subcommittee saw rising numbers of unassimilable aliens prone to criminal and
subversive behavior. Moreover, their access had been facilitated by questionable presidential
initiatives, flawed legislation, and implementation of vetting processes by a tainted and suspect
Displaced Persons Commission. In foreign officials, the subcommittee saw the expansion of Communist
networks as aliens used diplomatic privileges to exert direct influence over subversive activities in the
United States.
Existing law even as refined under other provisions of the McCarran omnibus bill would not be enough
to address these threats. A future restrictionist president would require broader authority over
curtailing alien entry. For McCarran and the subcommittee, there was no confusion or need for further

clarification as to what the language of Section 212(e) entailed. As Celler feared, such authority was
intended to be an untrammeled right.
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